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A Question and Some Answers   
In December 1783 the Berlinische Monatsschrift  published an article by the theologian and 
educational reformer Johann Friedrich Zöllner on the advisability of purely civil marriage ceremonies.  
Noting the journal’s frequent use of the terms “aufklären”, “aufgeklärte” and “Aufklärung”, he asked in a 
footnote:  
What is enlightenment?  This question, which is almost as important as what is 
truth, should indeed be answered before one begins enlightening!  And still have 
I never found it answered!1 
Few footnotes have made such a mark on the history of philosophy.  For the next decade a discussion of the 
nature and limits of enlightenment filled the pages of German literary and scholarly journals.2   
Immanuel Kant’s response is by far the most famous.  But, as Kant himself noted,  the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift had already published Moses Mendelssohn’s answer to the question before he had the chance 
to submit his response.3 
I have not seen this journal, otherwise I should have held back the above reflec-
tions.  I let them stand only as a means of finding out by comparison how far the 
thoughts of two individuals may coincide by chance.4 
There is no record of what Kant thought of Mendelssohn’s essay, nor — aside from a brief unpublished 
note5 — do we know much about Mendelssohn’s response to Kant’s answer.  Subsequent discussions of the 
question paid little attention to these first two contributions and few scholars since have taken up Kant’s 
suggestion and compared his response to Mendelssohn’s.6  That rather simple assignment is the task of this 
paper, which will argue that the most significant point to emerge from the comparison is the remarkable 
lack of agreement between the two responses.   
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The Terms of the Debate 
It is doubtful that Zöllner was as confused about the meaning of “Aufklärung” as his article im-
plied.  Like Mendelssohn, Zöllner was a member of the Mittwochsgesellschaft, a secret society of “Friends 
of the Enlightenment” closely linked to the Berlinische Monatsschrift.7  On December 17, 1783 — the 
month of Zöllner’s request for a definition — J. K. W. Möhsen read a paper to the society on the question 
“What is to be done towards the Enlightenment of Fellow Citizens?” which urged that members determine 
“what is Enlightenment?”.8  Discussion of the topic continued through the next April, with Mendelssohn 
delivering a lecture — which formed the basis of his subsequent article in the Berlinische Monatsschrift — 
the next May.9  Zöllner’s footnote was thus less a testimony to his ignorance of the term than to the intense 
interest in the question within the Mittwochsgesellschaft. 
Zöllner’s feigned confusion about the meaning of the word “Aufklärung” was largely a rhetorical 
gesture, but it did point to a peculiarity of linguistic usage which served as Mendelssohn’s point of 
departure: 
The words “enlightenment”,  “culture” [Kultur],  and “education”  [Bildung] are 
newcomers to our language.  They currently belong only to literary discourse.  
The masses scarcely understand them.10 
While it was only in the decade preceeding Mendelssohn’s essay that word “Aufklärung” entered into 
widespread usage in literary journals and moral weeklies,  it had a lengthy and distinguished pedigree.11  
Metaphors of light and of illumination are, of course, ubiquitous in Western philosophy and theology, and 
had also played an important role in Pietism,  where “Erleuchtung” was associated with process of conver-
sion and spiritual rebirth.12  The word “Aufklärung” itself, however, initially invoked rather different asso-
ciations.  In Kaspar Stieler’s Teutscher Sprachschatz  (1691) it is synonymous with “Ausklärung”— a 
change of weather conditions — although Stieler subsequently used the word metaphorically as a “clearing 
of the understanding”, as well as a “clearing of the weather”.13  Use of the adjectival form “aufgeklärt” to 
describe a return to consciousness after sleep or illness had become widespread by the middle of the 
eighteenth century.  In the first half of the eighteenth century “aufklären” along with “ausklären” and 
“erleuchten” was used to translate the English “enlighten” and French “éclairer”.14  By the 1760s reviews 
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of theological literature in Nicolai’s Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek employed “Aufklärung” to refer to the 
clarification of concepts and axioms.15  As early as 1741, the Hamburg Stats- und Gelehrte Zeitung  stated 
that efforts to make science more accessible meant that “our time could be called an enlightened time 
[unsere Zeit aufgeklärte Zeiten nennen können]”, while in 1770 Wieland contrasted the “level of enlighten-
ment [Grade der Aufklärung]” of the ancient Egyptians to subsequent peoples.16    By the 1780s,  the term 
Aufklärung had thus come to be used as a way of characterizing a culture or an epoch, including, of course, 
the present one:  in his writings prior to his 1784 essay in response to Zöllner’s question, Kant described his 
own time as an “age of critique”, “a thinking age”, and an “enlightened age”.17 
Since clear conventions of usage have not been established for the terms “Aufklärung”, “Kultur” 
and “Bildung”, Mendelssohn felt free to propose his own.18  All three terms, he stated, denoted 
“modifications of social life, the consequences of the industry and the efforts of mankind to better its social 
conditions”.19   Of the three the most fundamental was “Bildung” — a term which defies easy translation 
and can be rendered as “culture” or “education” —  and Aufklärung  can only be understood as one aspect 
of it.20  Aufklärung  is the “theoretical” side of the process of Bildung, involving a “rational reflection on 
the things of human life”.  Kultur,  in contrast, is concerned with such “practical” matters as “goodness, re-
finement, and beauty in handmade arts and social mores”.21  Summarizing the distinction for a friend, he 
wrote, “Enlightenment is concerned with the theoretical, with knowledge, with the elimination of preju-
dices;  culture is concerned with morality, sociality, art, with doing and not doing”.22 
Nothing assures that Aufklärung  and Kultur will proceed apace and there is always a danger of a 
one-sided development of Bildung.  Mendelssohn suggested that Nürnbergers and Frenchmen are more 
“cultured” than “enlightened”, while Berliners and Englishmen are more “enlightened” than “cultured”.  He 
could think of only one case where a harmony between Aufklärung  and Kultur  had been achieved: the an-
cient Greeks.23  In those cases where there is an imbalance between Aufklärung  and Kultur, they become 
susceptible to corruption and misuse.  A one-sided development of Kultur produces “arrogance,  hypocrisy,  
effeminacy,  superstition,  and slavery,” while a dominance of Aufklärung  results in a weakening of “moral 
sentiments” and a tendency towards “obtuseness, egoism,  irreligion,  and anarchy”.24  Thus, while enlight-
enment could remove prejudices, it could not create morality — that, in Mendelssohn’s view, was the re-
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sponsibility of culture.  To pursue Enlightenment without considering its impact on culture was to fall into 
the error of the French philosophes, who engaged in witty chatter and a shallow civility, but failed to im-
prove the well-being or the morality of their people.25 
 
The Destiny of Man 
Near the start of the essay,  Mendelssohn states,  “I set, at all times, the destiny of man 
[Bestimmung des Menschen] as the measure and goal of all our striving and efforts,  as a point on which we 
must set our eyes if we do not wish to lose ourselves”.26  The more a people is brought, through art and 
industry, into harmony with this destiny, the more “Bildung ” this people possesses.27  It is the goal towards 
which culture and Enlightenment strive, and if it is ever forgotten, both will fall into corruption.   
Mendelssohn had taken the term “destiny of man” from Johann Joachim Spalding’s 1748 book 
Bestimmung des Menschen.28   Spalding was a noted theologian and a member of the Mittwochsgesellschaft 
and his book was one of the more successful products of Enlightenment theology.29  Through a series of 
meditations on the questions “why do I exist” and “what should I do”, the book sought to frame a 
fundamental rule by which to guide one’s life.  The first possibility considered was that of a life devoted to 
the satisfaction of physical drives, a possibility quickly dismissed as offering no permanent satisfaction.  
Spalding next weighed the possibility of a life devoted to a more refined desire, that associated with 
aesthetic experience.  But such a life takes no consideration of my relationship to others, and it too is re-
jected.  The first serious contender as a possible destiny for man is a life devoted to the pursuit of virtue, 
which Spalding saw as arising from man’s natural disposition to work for the common good.  The pursuit 
of this end leads to the recognition that there is an even greater goal for which man is destined: immortality 
in the kingdom of God.30  For Spalding our “natural” ability to judge matters of right and wrong is, in fact, 
the “voice of God, the voice of eternal truth, which speaks in me”.31  This voice impels us to act to bring 
about a state of happiness which, because of the contingencies of human existence, can never be achieved 
on Earth.  But this very failure implies the promise of a future life wherein “my constrained and beclouded 
soul will be given so much more light and freedom that I will be assured of a complete Enlightenment of all 
the obscure parts of the plan by which the world is ruled”.32 
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Much in Spalding’s book appealed to Mendelssohn,  and one of his favorite mottos was “Destiny 
of Man:  To search for truth, to love the beautiful, to will the good, to do the best”.33  In January 1764,  
Mendelssohn’s friend Thomas Abbt suggested that he and Mendelssohn debate the merits of Spalding’s 
book, whose arguments remained for Abbt “shrouded in mystery”.34  Abbt, who had gained early fame with 
his patriotic treatise On Death for the Fatherland,  had studied philosophy, mathematics, and theology at 
Halle and was influenced both by the prevailing currents in rationalist Biblical criticism and by the more 
historically-minded works of his friend Justus Möser.  Abbt’s objections to Spalding — which were pub-
lished, along with Mendelssohn’s defense, in Nicolai’s Briefe, die neueste Litteratur betreffend  in June and 
July of 176435 — were precisely the sort of questions one would expect a more empiricist and historicist 
reader to raise against Spalding’s rationalist reconstruction of Christian faith.  What sort of knowledge, he 
asked, would be necessary to cast light on the problem of human destiny?  Spalding had undertaken an in-
trospective approach, examining his own concepts, and seeking to clarify what they implied.  Abbt, how-
ever, countered that what was necessary was an historical study of customs and mores, and argued that such 
a study would show that — far from being a universal “destiny” of mankind — the goals Spalding ascribed 
to the human race were the particular products of a refined, eighteenth-century intelligence.36 
These methodological objections were joined to a strange story — alleged by Abbt to have been 
taken from a sixteenth-century chronicle of a military expedition.  A prince brings his troops into a foreign 
country for a purpose which remains obscure to all involved in the operation.  The progress of the regiment 
is halted, temporary quarters are set up, and the men wait.  Time passes and the soldiers amuse themselves 
with various frivolous pastimes.  Some disappear in the middle of night, and discussion rages as to what 
might have happened to them.  Were they called away as part of a secret plan?  Had they finished their as-
signment?  Was their release a reward for good conduct?  Could those who claimed to have received letters 
from them be trusted?  And what of the officers, who remained ever alert for orders but who never received 
any?  Were they being punished for previous offenses?  This, Abbt suggested, was the true destiny of man:  
an unhappy waiting,  in “darkness and uncertainty”,  for commands which never come.37 
 Abbt argued that the progress of Spalding’s meditations from physical desire to a knowledge of 
God was driven, not by inclinations inherent in man, but rather by the force of Spalding’s own rhetoric.  
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The argument of Die Bestimmung des Menschen  presupposed what it set out to prove.  The “inclinations” 
which it alleged to uncover were not the natural foundations of morality and religion,  but were rather the 
consequences of reflection and teaching.  There is no reason why a primitive people could not find a life 
devoted to sensual pursuits completely satisfying, and no reason why an inclination to avoid harming other 
creatures should ever be broadened into a universal love of mankind.  Nor, finally, was there any necessary 
development leading from rudimentary rules of morality to a vision of the place of man in a divine plan.  
Like the marching orders of the lost regiment, the beginning and end of life were “shrouded with clouds”.  
But — and this was consolation enough for Abbt — there was “just enough light” for men to walk the path 
in between.38 
Mendelssohn’s defense of Spalding’s book did little to answer these criticisms.  He argued that the 
“destiny of man” is revealed both through “reason and experience” and that to learn his destiny man must 
ask both what he “should be” and what he “is”.  One can consider the “the wild and the civilized, king, beg-
gar, the worldly wise and the flunkey”, all will reveal the same destiny.  All nature manifests God’s pur-
pose, and all the things in the world are signs of the “thought of the Almighty” awaiting interpretation.39  
Against Abbt,  Mendelssohn argued that the “destiny of man”  is not the product of culture and education;  
education only determines whether an individual is able to articulate the destiny which, consciously or un-
consciously, he fulfills in his life on earth.40  Even a child who dies while still an infant has had the op-
portunity to develop its powers, and thus can be said to have fulfilled a destiny.41  It may appear that thou-
sands of potentialities are cut short in their development, and are never fully realized;  but this is only be-
cause we have not understood their role in the divine plan.  The universe is like a watch whose different 
parts turn at different speeds — indeed, some turn so slowly that the they seem not to move at all.  But all 
are united by a single purpose.42 
While Mendelssohn’s response to Abbt betrays little doubt about the coherence of Spalding’s ar-
guments,  he did make one concession in a commentary on Abbt’s correspondence published after Abbt’s 
death.  Here he noted an ambiguity in the German “Bestimmung”.  The word connotes both 
“determination” (the “establishment of one predicate from among the many which could belong to a 
subject”)  and “destination” (“the establishment of a goal, to which something serves as a means”).  
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Mendelssohn suggested that “Bestimmung” should be reserved for “determination”, while the sense of 
“destination” is better captured by the German “Beruf” — “calling” or “vocation”.43  But this linguistic 
clarification only heightens the problem.  It is central to Spalding’s account that a definition of what man is 
— or, in Mendelssohn’s terminology, a “determining” of what predicates attach to the subject “man” — 
necessarily involves knowledge of what purposes man fulfills — or, in Mendelssohn’s terminology, what 
his “destination” is.  Through Wolff, Spalding had taken over enough of the Aristotlean edifice to make his 
concept of man, like Aristotle’s, a teleological one.44  Saying what man “is” necessarily involves explaining 
what purposes or ends he fulfills.  And it is this teleological conception which drives Spalding’s entire 
argument:  I begin reflecting on what I am and I discover, within myself, a bundle of goals — each more 
universal than the one before — which constitute my destiny.  To suggest, as Mendelssohn’s distinction 
between “destiny” and “determination” does, that it is possible to distinguish between what man “is” and 
what purposes man fulfills opens a gap which, as Kant would show in his ethical writings, cannot be 
bridged.  It implies that a study of “the wild and the civilized, king, beggar, the worldly wise and the 
flunkey” may well tell us what these characters are,  but not what purposes  they ought to fulfill.  And this, 
after all, had been precisely Abbt’s point:  an historical study of customs and mores can tell us much about 
the different ways in which men live.  But it leaves us in the dark as to what the “destiny of man” might be. 
 
Man and Citizen 
While Mendelssohn did not pursue this tension “determination” and “destiny”,  he did devote con-
siderable attention to a conflict within the “destiny of man” itself.  Nothing, he argued,  insures that the 
“destiny of man as man” will accord with the “destiny of man as citizen [Bürger]”.  The problem does not 
arise for “culture”, since its goal can be nothing other than the cultivation of a Bürger, a member of politi-
cal society, possessing certain rights and duties,  equipped with the skills and abilities to perform a specific 
set of tasks.  From the standpoint of “culture”,  the “destiny of man” is simply membership in civil 
society.45  But the possibility of a conflict between the “destiny of man as man” and the “destiny of man as 
citizen” does plague the process of enlightenment.  “Civic enlightenment” [Bürgeraufklärung] must adjust 
itself according to the ranks of society it addresses, while “human enlightenment” [Menschenaufklärung]  
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— which knows no audience other than “man as man” — pays heed neither to social distinctions nor to the 
maintenance of social order.  “Certain truths,” Mendelssohn noted, “which are useful to man, as man, can 
at times be harmful to him as citizen”.46   
So long as this “collision” between human enlightenment and civic enlightenment is confined to 
matters which do not directly address the “essential” destiny of man as man or man as citizen,  and thus do 
not put into question either those aspects of man which distinguish him from animals or those dimensions 
of civic duties which are necessary for the preservation of public order, Mendelssohn sees little cause for 
concern and feels that rules can easily be drawn up to resolve potential conflicts.47  A conflict between the 
“essential” destiny of man as citizen and either his “essential” or his “fortuitous” destiny as man is, how-
ever, a good deal more serious.  “Without the essential destiny of man”, Mendelssohn explained, “man 
sinks to the level of the beast;  without his fortuitous destiny, he is no longer a good and splendid crea-
ture.”48  The most severe conflict occurs in those “unhappy” states when the essential destinies of man as 
man and man as citizen collide.  In such cases that Enlightenment which “is indispensable for man cannot 
be disseminated through all classes of the realm without the constitution being in danger of perishing.” 
Here philosophy lays its hand on its mouth!  Necessity may here prescribe laws, 
or forge fetters, which are applied to man, to force him down, and hold him un-
der its yoke! 49  
When the collision is between man’s “essential” destiny as a citizen and his “fortuitous” destiny as man, 
the consequences are less grim.  Here it is not a question of a state reducing man to the level of an animal, 
but rather of a situation where “certain useful and — for mankind — adorning truths may not be 
disseminated without the current fundamental propositions of religion and morality being torn down”.50 In 
such cases the “virtue-loving Aufklärer  will... endure prejudice rather than drive it away with that truth 
which is intertwined so tightly with it”.51 
Mendelssohn elaborated this point in a short article published in February of 1785 in the 
Berlinische Monatsschrift  on the question of whether fanaticism could be successfully combatted through 
the use of satire.52  He noted that there had been a marked decline in the quality of humor and wit since the 
writings of Lord Shaftesbury, and suggested that, among today’s writers,  mockery often produces no in-
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sight.  “Nothing is more opposed to the true good of mankind,” he argued,  “than this sham enlightenment,  
where everyone mouths a hackneyed wisdom,  from which the spirit has already long vanished;  where 
everyone ridicules prejudices, without distinguishing what is true in them from what is false”.53  Indeed, 
such a sham enlightenment may well lead to an increase in popular superstitions. 
When shallow philosophy and immorality have barbarized the sentiments, 
mankind longs after childlike innocence, and falls again into childish foolish-
ness.  One would rather be surrounded by spirits than to live among talking 
corpses in a dead nature.  One would rather live in Cockaigne than to live with-
out God any longer.54 
Superstition and fanaticism are thus consequences of the sorry state of German philosophy and education.  
The Leibniz-Wolff philosophy had once had such a pervasive influence on German thought and indeed on 
the German language itself that fanatical and atheistic texts could scarcely be written, let alone acclaimed.55  
But now this had all changed and it was possible for “insipid twaddle” like the System de la Nature  to find 
not only a translator, but also many readers.  And with this change, there was a danger that it would be for-
gotten that “the destiny of man … is not to suppress prejudices, but rather to illuminate them”.56  
 
Enlightenment as Exit, Immaturity as Guilt 
Mendelssohn’s response to Zöllner’s question remained loyal to the conventions of Wolff’s phil-
osophy and mirrored the convictions and reservations about Enlightenment which reigned within the 
Mittwochsgesellschaft.  Kant’s definition of enlightenment broke with these conventions, but it is difficult 
for us — because his definition has become so familiar — to recognize how strange it was. 
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.  
Immaturity  is man’s inability to use one’s own understanding without the guid-
ance of another.  This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of un-
derstanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of 
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another.  The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude!  “Have courage 
to use your own understanding!” 57  
These now familiar words would have struck a contemporary reader as peculiar on at least two counts.  
First,  while Mendelssohn had defined enlightenment with reference to the goal it fosters — “destiny of 
man” — Kant defines enlightenment not in terms of what it achieves, but rather in terms of what it 
escapes.58  While readers of the Critique of Pure Reason might well conclude that Kant in effect posits au-
tonomy as the ultimate goal of the process of Enlightenment,  Kant himself was curiously reluctant to 
formulate his definition of Enlightenment in this way.  Indeed,  in the brief discussion of Enlightenment in 
the Critique of Judgment, he stressed its “merely negative” character.59  Second,  Kant’s definition is 
couched in a bizarre set of legal metaphors, beginning with the paradoxical notion of an “immaturity” for 
which one is somehow to blame [selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit] and continuing through a sarcastic 
discussion of “guardians” [Vormünder] whose main concern is to make sure that none of their wards attain 
maturity.60  The use of these terms in jurisprudence is clear enough: “Unmündigkeit” can mean both an 
“minority of age” [Minderjährigkeit] and “legal or civil immaturity”.61  Those who are legally immature — 
a group which includes children, so long as they remain “naturally immature”, and women, no matter what 
age — must be represented in legal proceedings by a “curator” [Kurator], a “proxy” [Stellvertreter], or a 
“guardian” [Vormund].62  But what is more difficult to understand — and indeed what Kant’s friend and 
critic Johann Georg Hamann regard as the “proton Pseudos  [fundamental error]” of the entire essay — is 
how one could possibly be responsible for one’s own immaturity.63 
Release from “natural” immaturity  — which, needless to say, could hardly be “self-incurred” — 
comes about simply as a consequence of coming of age.  But release from that immaturity which arises not 
from a “lack of understanding” but rather as a consequence of a moral failure — a “lack of resolution and 
courage” to use one’s understanding “without the guidance of another” — is a good deal more difficult.64  
One who has been made immature soon becomes fond of this state, has no inclination to leave it, and — 
since his self-appointed guardians  have never allowed him to try to use his own reason — has little ability 
to think for himself.  “Dogmas and formulas” become the “ball and chain of his permanent immaturity”, 
and even those who somehow manage to free themselves from these “mechanical instruments” of thought 
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find themselves so unaccustomed to thinking freely that they are“uncertain about jumping over even the 
narrowest of trenches”.65 
While it is next to impossible for individuals to tear themselves out of this self-imposed immatu-
rity,  the prospect of “an entire public enlightening itself” is considerably brighter.  Indeed, for Kant, such 
enlightenment is inevitable, “if only the public is left in freedom”.  Even among the established guardians, 
there will be a few individuals who have learned to “think for themselves”, and, having “thrown off the 
yoke of immaturity”,  they will “disseminate the spirit of rational respect for personal value and for the vo-
cation of every man to think for himself”.66 
 
“Sapere Aude!”:  Defining — and Transforming — Enlightenment 
While Kant devotes a good deal of attention to the origins of “Unmündigkeit”, he has less to say 
about what actually constitutes “maturity”.  Mündigkeit is the courage to make use of one’s own reason,  
the ability to use one’s own understanding without the direction of others and “The motto of enlightenment 
is therefore:  Sapere aude! ”.67  The “motto” invoked here comes from Horace — one of Kant’s favorite 
classical authors — although Kant could also have known it from Wichman’s German translation of 
Shaftesbury’s Characteristics, where it appeared on the frontispiece.68  But, as Franco Venturi has noted, 
there was another use of the motto, a use which was intimately tied to the Berlin enlightenment.69  The 
words “Sapere Aude” had appeared on a medal struck in Berlin in 1736 under the direction of Ernst 
Christoph von Manteuffel, an advisor to the young Frederick the Great and a friend of Christian Wolff.70  
His Berlin residence was frequented by state officials, scholars, and literati and he was the main force 
behind the “Société des Aléthophiles” — “The Society of the Friends of Truth” —  a group of clergy, 
lawyers, and civil servants dedicated to the spreading of truth in general, and the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy 
in particular.71  The society’s medal showed an armed Minerva, with the heads of Leibniz and Wolff among 
the plumes on her helmet.  Written around the medal were the words “Sapere Aude”. 
But the way the motto Sapere Aude was understood by the Aléthophiles differed markedly from 
the way Kant, drawing out the implications of the Critique of Pure Reason, reinterpreted it.  For the 
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Aléthophiles the motto translated rather easily into the language of Wolff’s philosophy:  “Hold nothing as 
true, hold nothing as false,” read one of the rules of the society, “so long as you have been convinced of it 
by no sufficient reason [zureichenden Grund]”.72  Wolff and Baumgarten derived the “Principle of 
Sufficient Reason” from the “Principle of Contradiction”, arguing that just as it is impossible for something 
“to be and at the same time not be”, so too “nothing is without a sufficient reason why it is rather than is 
not”.73  They saw the task of philosophy to be that of offering a rigorous set of deductions — starting with 
the most general notions of being in ontology, proceeding onward through more specific disciplines such as 
cosmology, psychology, and theology — which show the reasons why things are as they are and not 
otherwise. 
The services rendered by the “Principle of Sufficient Reason” to the Berlin Aufklärung were con-
siderable.  It ensured that their arguments would not only be internally consistent but would also offer a 
valid account of the nature of reality.  To show why certain predicates are contained in certain subjects is to 
show the reason why something exists or occurs.  Thus Wolff, for example, starting from premises about 
the relationship of study and exercise in human life, deduced the grounds on which coffee houses rested.74  
The thought that everything in the world, from the most general moral principles to the most specific polit-
ical, social, and economic arrangements, rested on good reasons offered a comforting argument in favor of 
the coherence and rationality of the existing order.75 
Kant, however, was acutely aware that Wolff’s use of the principle of sufficient reason promised 
far more than it could possibly deliver.76  Nothing was easier, as Kant demonstrated in the “Transcendental 
Dialectic”, than the positing of arguments which were logically consistent but which could not possibly re-
fer to actual objects.  There is, he wrote, “a natural and inevitable illusion, which rests on subjective prin-
ciples, and foists them upon us as objective”.77  This, indeed, was the most important sense in which the 
Leibniz-Wolff philosophy could be described as dogmatic:  because it had never attempted a critique of the 
limits of reason,  it routinely extended a priori judgments — whose proper function is to express the possi-
bility of objects which must subsequently be confirmed in actual experience — beyond the field of any pos-
sible experience.78 
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The peculiar difficulty of enlightenment, as Kant would note in the Critique of Judgment, lay in its 
“merely negative” character.  The demand that one “think for oneself” was understood by Kant as a 
“liberation from prejudices” in general, and a “liberation from superstition” in particular.79  Reason must 
never be merely “passive”;  it must instead be actively “self-legislative”.  Such an attitude is relatively easy 
so long as one “does not demand to know anything that is beyond his own understanding”.  But it is diffi-
cult to resist the temptation to strive for such knowledge and even more difficult, once one gives in to the 
temptation, to avoid a surrender of one’s autonomy to those “who promise us with much assurance that 
they can satisfy our desire for it”.80  Sapere Aude!  — but, Kant would add,  also recognize when knowing 
had reached its limits.  Beyond these limits lies “the lure of an imagined felicity” which “keeps so many in 
bondage to theories and systems”.  “Have courage to use your own understanding!”  — but do not be so 
foolhearty as to pass beyond “those Pillars of Hercules which nature herself has erected in order that the 
voyage of our reason may be extended no further than the continuous coastline of experience”.  Once 
reasoning has lost contact with experience it embarks on a voyage across “a shoreless ocean which, after 
alluring us with ever-deceptive prospects, compels us in the end to abandon as hopeless all this vexatious 
and tedious endeavour.”81  Thus, oddly enough, one of the things from which enlightenment — as Kant 
understood it — frees us is a belief in enlightenment — as Mendelssohn and the Mittwochsgesellschaft 
understood it. 
Public Argument and Private Obedience 
For enlightenment to prosper “all that is needed is freedom”.  The freedom Kant had in mind is 
“the most innocuous form of all — freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters”.82  By 
“public” use, Kant meant that “use which anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire 
reading public [ganzen Publikum der Leserwelt]”.  It is contrasted to that “private” use “which a person 
may make of it in a particular civil post or office which he is entrusted”.83 In one’s private use of reason, 
one behaves “passively”, bound by an “artificial accord” to advance or to defend certain “public ends”.  
One functions as “part of a machine”, and here it is “impermissible to argue”.  In contrast, in one’s public 
use of reason, one acts as “ a member of the complete commonwealth [ganzes gemeinen Wesen] or even of 
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a cosmopolitan society [Weltbürgergesellschaft ]”.  Here an individual “may indeed argue without harming 
the affairs in which he is employed in part in a private capacity”.  Restrictions on the private use of reason 
in no way contradict the goal of enlightenment,  but the public use of reason must remain free,  since “it 
alone can bring about enlightenment among men”.84 
Kant’s distinction between public and private uses of reason has struck a number of commentators 
— beginning Mendelssohn himself — as quite peculiar.85  While Mendelssohn had argued against limiting 
“human enlightenment”, Kant saw a need to restrict the “private” use of reason.  And while Mendelssohn 
had argued that “civic enlightenment” needed to be adjusted to different stations and circumstances, Kant 
opposed any restriction on the “public use” of reason.  The confusion can be mitigated once it is recognized 
that Kant does not associate the “private sphere” with “the merely individual or personal”.86  Private uses of 
reason take place in a sphere of contractual agreements where individuals alienate their talents to others for 
the purpose of advancing common goals.  Thus, to invoke Kant’s examples, an army officer has agreed to 
carry out the commands given by superiors,  citizens have agreed to pay the taxes a state has imposed,  and 
a clergyman has agreed to deliver sermons to pupils in catechism or to his congregation which conform to 
the guidelines established by his faith.87  In none of these cases are we dealing with Mendelssohn’s “man as 
man”.  In all of them a “man” functions as part of civil society, a civil society peopled by individuals who 
have entered into contracts which bind them to others. 
While individuals must fulfill the terms of the contracts into which they have entered regarding the 
private use of their reason, they nevertheless retain full control over their “public use of reason”.  Kant’s 
notion of the “public sphere” is every bit as peculiar as his discussion of the private sphere.  The meaning 
of the term in jurisprudence was straightforward enough: “public” meant simply “pertaining to the state”.  
But while Kant had followed Roman Law conventions in viewing the private sphere as a sphere of con-
tracts, his treatment of the public sphere as a “world of readers” or “cosmopolitan society” eschewed 
prevailing conventions in jurisprudence and embraced a rival conception held by writers and publicists who 
published in journals like the Berlinische Monatsschrift  and scholars and men of letters who gathered in 
societies like the Mittwochsgesellschaft .  In this upstart tradition, “the public” was a reading public, those 
residents of cities with the inclination, the time, and the taste to read, discuss, and criticize the stream of 
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books and journals which flooded the literary marketplace in the last half of the eighteenth century.88  Thus, 
as “men of learning [Gelehrte]” who address a reading public, Kant’s soldiers, citizens, and clergymen 
retain the right to criticize those commands which they have been faithfully executing with the private use 
of their reason.89 
Of the three cases Kant discussed, the greatest attention was devoted to the question of the respon-
sibilities of the clergy.  While a clergyman may write whatever he pleases in books and articles addressed 
to the reading public,  when he is directly addressing his pupils or his congregation, he is bound to adhere 
to his church’s “symbols” — those basic doctrines of the faith to which clergymen and teachers were 
required to swear allegiance before taking up their posts.90  In Kant’s day the legitimacy of such oaths had 
become a matter of heated discussion:  in 1773 Nicolai had written a satirical novel about a Lutheran 
minister dismissed for deviating from his oath and Mendelssohn, in his recently published Jerusalem,  had 
argued that such oaths were either pointless or improper.91  The basic principles shared by all religions 
cannot be confirmed by oaths since, Mendelssohn argued, the very institution of oath swearing is itself 
dependent on these same basic principles.  An oath would remain “an empty sound” unless one already 
believed the veracity of the person who swears it — in which case the administration of the oath would be 
pointless.92  Nor can the particular articles which distinguish one faith from another be the object of oaths.  
The state has no right “to pry into men’s souls and force them to make avowals which can bring neither 
comfort nor profit to society”.93  Mendelssohn rejected even a limited use of oaths for those offices 
entrusted to individuals “on the condition of conformity”, arguing that such procedures, by forcing 
individuals to swear an unyielding allegiance to propositions which they might come to doubt at some point 
after they assumed office, were an invitation to hypocrisy.94 
Mendelssohn’s argument had been criticized by both Johann David Michaelis — an Orientalist 
who had earlier argued against the extension of civil rights to Jews on the grounds that any oaths they 
might swear could not be taken seriously — and by Johann Friedrich Zöllner.95  Mendelssohn dispensed 
with Michaelis’ personal — and anti-Semitic — attack in an essay published in the January 1784 issue of 
the Berlinische Monatsschrift .96 But Zöllner’s criticisms were a more serious matter.  Zöllner argued that 
Mendelssohn’s indifference to the distinction between “religion” and “church” led him to overlook the fact 
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that, as a community of individuals devoted to the cause of advancing a religion, a church — like other so-
cieties — is free to demand that its members affirm their allegiance to its  general principles.97  While 
Mendelssohn was justified in arguing that the vocabulary of “rights” and “duties” was inappropriate in dis-
cussions of the relationships between God and the faithful which constitute religion, this did not mean that 
churches, as institutions, cannot impose duties on their members.98  
The question of the limits of those duties which bound an official of a church stood at the center of 
Kant’s discussion.  With Zöllner — and implicitly against Mendelssohn — Kant argued that, insofar as 
they were fulfilling their responsibilities to the church as an institution, clergymen must adhere to the 
teachings of the church, even in those cases where they might have reservations as to their truth.  Kant in-
sisted that “There is nothing in this which need trouble the conscience.”  What an individual taught as an 
officer of the church “is presented by him as something which he is not empowered to teach at his own dis-
cretion, but which he is employed to expound in a prescribed manner and in someone else’s name.” 
He will say: Our church teaches this or that, and these are the arguments it uses.  
He then extracts as much practical value as possible for his congregation from 
precepts to which he would not himself subscribe with full conviction, but 
which he can nevertheless undertake to expound, since it is not entirely im-
possible that they may contain truth.”99   
The interest of Kant’s clergyman — like the Critique of Pure Reason — is in the practical, not the dog-
matic, dimension of religion.  It is “not entirely impossible” that the doctrines of the church are true — but, 
in any case, religion is a matter of practical faith, not of theoretical certainty.  There is, however, a limit to 
how far a clergyman may go in maintaining this separation between official dogma and personal 
conviction:  “nothing contrary to the essence of religion” must be present in the teachings of the church, for 
if this were the case the clergyman “would not be able to carry out his official duties in good conscience, 
and would have to resign”.100 
In much of this Kant was simply articulating the existing Prussian policy.101  In cases brought 
before the “Spiritual Department” in 1776 and again in 1783, Baron von Zedlitz — the head of the depart-
ment — ruled that while clergy may write whatever they please in theological or philosophical articles ad-
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dressed to the reading public, they must be careful to distinguish these scholarly opinions from their re-
sponsibilities as representatives of the church in their parishes.102  Kant was undoubtedly familiar with these 
decisions: the 1776 case involved the Königsberg clergyman Johann August Starck, and the 1783 case 
involved Johann Heinrich Schulz’s Versuch einer Anleitung zur Sittenlehre für alle Menschen, ohne 
Unterschied der Religion, a work which Kant reviewed shortly after its publication.103   
When Kant described “the age of enlightenment” as “the century of Frederick”,  he must have 
been thinking of policies such as these.  Under Frederick’s “enlightened” rule,  he wrote, “venerable clergy, 
without offense to their official duties, may in their capacity as scholars [Gelehrten] freely and publicly 
submit to the judgment of the world their verdicts and opinions, even if they deviate here and there from 
orthodox doctrine [angenommenen Symbol].”104  While Mendelssohn saw the possibility of a conflict 
between the “enlightenment of man” and the “enlightenment of the citizen” which would force philosophy 
into silence,  Kant saw little need for concern.  The “enlightenment of man” was carried out by scholars 
addressing the reading public;  what Mendelssohn had called the “enlightenment of the citizen” was a 
matter for the “private” use of reason.  There was no need for a collision between the two spheres, so long 
as they remain rigorously distinguished from one another.  Scholarly reflections must not be allowed to 
disturb the functioning of the private sphere,  just as nothing in the private sphere can be allowed to restrict 
the free discourse of the public sphere.  The compromise by which Kant sought to avoid those 
consequences of enlightenment which so troubled Mendelssohn found a pithy summary in the maxim he 
credited to Frederick: “Argue as much as you like and about what you like, but obey!”105 
The private sphere could remain undisturbed by the “innocuous” freedom of an unrestricted public 
use of reason because of a “strange and unexpected pattern in human affairs”:   
A high degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people’s intellectual 
freedom, yet it also sets up insuperable barriers to it.  Conversely, a lesser 
degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to expand its 
fullest extent.106 
Frederick could afford to let citizens argue as much as they liked because he had at hand “a well-
disciplined and numerous army to guarantee the public security”.  A ruler of a “republic” [Freistaat] could 
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not risk allowing the same freedom of public discussion — in the absence of a large army, the free public 
use of reason might have less innocuous consequences.107 
While Kant felt that the critique of arms was more than enough to protect the private sphere from 
the arms of critique, a different mechanism protected the public sphere from the intrusions of the private 
sphere.  The danger here was that the restrictions on argument necessary for the maintenance of the con-
tractual arrangements of the private sphere might overstep their legitimate area of application and restrict 
the public use of reason.  Again, it is the example of religious freedom that best illustrates the problem.  
Like Zöllner, Kant saw nothing objectionable in a church requiring its representatives to teach the doctrines 
of their religion according to certain established conventions.  But both Zöllner and Kant agreed with 
Mendelssohn — implicitly opposing Michaelis — that no church was free to “commit itself by oath to an 
unalterable set of doctrines”.108  
One age cannot enter into alliance on oath to put the next age in a position where 
it would be impossible for it to extend and correct its knowledge … or to make 
any progress whatsoever in enlightenment.  This would be a crime against 
human nature, whose original destiny [Bestimmung] lies in precisely such 
progress.109 
Kant proposed a simple test to determine whether any particular measure could be adopted as a law:  “we 
need only ask whether a people could impose such a law upon itself”.110  While it might be necessary, for 
short periods of time, to impose a particular set of political and social arrangements, pending a better solu-
tion, even during such periods Kant insists that “each citizen, particularly the clergyman, would be given a 
free hand as a scholar to comment publicly, i.e.,  in his writings, on the inadequacies of current institu-
tions”.111  But to agree — “even for a single lifetime” — upon a permanent, unquestionable religious con-
stitution,  would be to adopt a law which would “virtually nullify a phase of man’s progress”.  The renun-
ciation of enlightenment — whether by a people, a monarch or even an individual — “means violating and 
trampling underfoot the sacred rights of mankind”.112 
What Enlightenment Was  19 
 
Conclusion:  What Kant Expected and What he Accomplished 
We can now understand why Kant submitted his article with the thought that readers might see 
“how far the thoughts of two individuals may coincide by chance”.  It is not simply that he knew that both 
he and Mendelssohn were responding to the same question.  It is also quite likely, as Eberhard Günter 
Schulz has suggested, that Kant assumed that Mendelssohn would be dealing with the problems which 
Zöllner had raised in his critique of Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem, problems that Kant’s distinction between 
public and private uses of reason also addressed.113   
As it turned out, Kant was wrong.  Mendelssohn left Zöllner’s critique unanswered, and devoted 
the last two years of his life to an increasingly bitter controversy with a far less friendly critic: Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi.  A little over a year before Zöllner requested a definition of enlightenment, Jacobi had 
posed a more troubling question to Mendelssohn:  whether he was aware that “Lessing in his last days was 
a decided Spinozist”.114 The charge of Spinozism was tantamount to atheism, and the suggestion that 
Lessing, the pride of the enlightenment, had been led to embrace what Jacobi characterized as a godless 
fatalism struck at everything that Mendelssohn and his colleagues in Berlin Aufklärung  — dubbed the 
“Morgue Berlinoise” by Jacobi — held dear.115  Mendelssohn’s essay on question “What is 
Enlightenment?” was thus a last testament of faith in a position already under serious attack. 
In the controversy between Jacobi and Mendelssohn, Kant occupied a curious position:  both sides 
assumed that Kant would soon cast his lot with them.116  But when “What is Orientation in Thinking?” — 
Kant’s long-awaited contribution to the dispute  — finally appeared in the Berlinische Monatsschrift, Kant 
set himself apart from both parties.  Against Jacobi, Kant argued that in seeking “orientation” in speculative 
thinking, there is no need to appeal to “some alleged truth-sense, nor a transcendent intuition dubbed faith”;  
here, as elsewhere, “reason alone” suffices.117  But he also stressed that reason could not provide the sort of 
proofs of God’s existence that Mendelssohn had offered in his Morgenstunden.  The proper function of 
reason was to free concepts from contradictions and to defend the “maxims of sound reason” from the 
“sophistical attacks of speculations.118 
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Kant answered the question “What is Enlightenment?” by reinterpreting the meaning of 
Enlightenment along the lines of the Critique of Pure Reason.  His contribution to the Pantheism 
Controversy established his critical philosophy as alternative to both the Jacobi’s “irrationalism” and to 
Mendelssohn’s “dogmatism”.  Warning of the dangers of appeals to faith and of unfettered speculation, he 
was thus able to claim the mantle of Enlightenment for himself.   
 
James Schmidt 
Boston University 
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Abbt in Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften 6/1:48. 
34 Letter from Thomas Abbt of January 11, 1764 in Mendelssohn, 
Gesammelte Schriften; for a discussion of Abbt and of his relationship with Mendelssohn, 
see Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn pp. 100-112. 
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What Enlightenment Was  32 
 
 
72 Janssens-Knorsch p. 259. 
73 Wolff, Philosophia prima, sive Ontologica (Frankfurt:  Libraria 
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87 AA VIII:37-38 [Political Writings, p. 56].  In his discussion of freedom of 
expression, Klein had used the examples of military officers and of writers addressing 
religious issues;  “Über Denk- und Drukfreiheit”, Berlinische Monatsschrift  III:327-328 
[Hinske pp. 404-405]. 
88 For a discussion of the changing conception of the “public” in eighteenth-
century Germany, see John Christian Laursen, “The Subversive Kant: The Vocabulary of 
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106 AA VIII:41 [Political Writings, p. 59]. 
107 AA VIII:41 [Political Writings, p. 59]. 
108 AA VIII:38-39 [Political Writings, p. 57].  Zöllner (p. 146) agreed with 
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